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activity. Thus, isolation of SHUV from malformed brains 
may indicate strong neurotropism of this putative patho-
gen. The possibility of its replication in the fetal nervous 
system should also be considered because an affected fe-
tus that is born alive is likely a reservoir. Indeed, AKAV 
was identified in the hippocampus (only) of adult lactating 
cows (data not shown), and similar epidemiologic evidence 
might result from other Simbu virus infections.
A serologic survey conducted in Israel during the 
2001–2003 outbreaks of AHS showed reactivity of AINV 
to serum samples of ruminants in Israel’s southern regions 
(3). Because AINV and SHUV are known to have a strong 
serologic cross-reaction, SHUV has likely previously in-
filtrated Israel. However, whether the seroreactivity results 
from AINV or SHUV remains unresolved.
The emergence and reemergence of arboviruses 
should interest medical practitioners, particularly epi-
demiologists. The appearance of exotic viruses in unex-
pected locations might result in more severe pathology 
in newly invaded regions than in the original arbovirus-
endemic areas. Furthermore, SHUV has been detected in 
a child with febrile illness (2), a finding that suggests a 
potential zoonotic problem.
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Table. Summary of diagnostic and laboratory findings, animal species, sample materials, and region where samples were collected in 
the study of Shuni virus infection in ruminants, Israel, 2014–15* 
Animal 
no. 
Laboratory 
no. Species Clinical manifestation Region PCR-positive sample 
Vero 
isolation 
Virus isolation 
in mice 
1 2417/1/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Negative Negative 
2 2417/2/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain Negative Negative 
3 267/2/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain Not done Not done 
4 267/3/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain Not done Not done 
5 267/4/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain Not done Not done 
6 2498/1/14 Sheep Weak lamb syndrome Northern valley Brain, EDTA-blood Negative Negative 
7 2504/1/14 Sheep Malformed aborted fetus Northern valley Brain Not done Not done 
8 2504/2/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Negative Negative 
9 273/14 Sheep† Malformed, aborted fetus Negev Brain Not done Not done 
10 274/14 Sheep Aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Not done Not done 
11 2504/3/14 Sheep† Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Positive Positive 
12 275/1/14 Sheep Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Negative Negative 
13 275/2/14 Sheep Malformed aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Not done Not done 
14 263/14 Goat Malformed, aborted fetus Northern valley Brain, placenta Not done Not done 
15 215/14 Cattle Aborted fetus Upper Galilee Brain Negative Negative 
*Not done, not performed if insufficient brain material was available for cerebral inoculation or if the infected brain failed to propagate in the cell line. For 
some animals, >1 sample was collected. 
†Sequences used to build the phylogenetic trees in online Technical Appendix Figure 2 (http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/21/12/15-0804-Techapp1.pdf). 
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To the Editor: Since the first detection of the influenza 
A(H5N1) virus in geese in China during 1996 (http://www.
cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h5n1-virus.htm), H5 subtype viruses 
have continued to reassort and evolve, giving rise to mul-
tiple virus clades and gene constellations. Recently, clade 
2.3.4.4 viruses have shown a predilection for genetic reas-
sortment, giving rise to H5N2, H5N5, H5N6, and H5N8 
virus subtypes, and have become globally widespread, 
causing infections in wild birds or poultry elsewhere in 
Asia, and in Europe and North America (1–3). The H5N6 
subtype viruses have circulated in China since 2013 and 
have been mainly identified in ducks or chickens in the 
southern (Jiangxi, Guangdong) or western (Sichuan) areas 
(4,5). Two lineages of H5N6 viruses with distant genetic 
background were found among the H5N6 viruses isolated 
in China (5).
In China, there have been 3 cases of H5N6 virus 
infection among humans, causing 2 deaths. We recent-
ly reported the clinical characteristics and progression 
of a patient infected by the H5N6 virus in Guangzhou 
City, China, who was the second reported case-patient 
infected with this subtype (6). After having contact with 
poultry, he began to manifest an influenza-like illness 
on December 3, 2014, and progressed to a primary viral 
pneumonia. The H5N6 virus A/Guangzhou/39715/2014 
(GenBank accession nos. KP765785–KP765792) was 
isolated from a throat swab specimen collected on day 8 
of his illness by inoculation into 9–11-day-old, specific 
pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs. He recovered 
from his infection and was discharged from the hospital 
on day 58.
Multiple sequence alignments showed that the hemag-
glutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes of A/Guang-
zhou/39715/2014 shared the highest nucleotide identity 
with A/chicken/Dongguan/2690/2013 (H5N6) (99.4% and 
98.3%, respectively) (online Technical Appendix 1, http://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/12/15-0809-Techapp1.
pdf). All internal genes were also closely related to A/chick-
en/Dongguan/2690/2013 (H5N6), ranging from 98.5% nu-
cleotide identity for the polymerase acidic (PA) gene and 
100.0% for the matrix (M) gene. The genome segments 
were also 98.2%–99.7% identical to A/duck/Guangdong/
GD012014 and 98.3%–99.4% identical to A/chicken/Laos/
LPQ001/2014, which caused outbreaks in domestic ducks 
and poultry, respectively, indicating that these viruses have 
the same genotype.
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Figure. Phylogenetic trees of influenza A(H5N6) virus isolate A/Guangzhou/39715/2014 compared with other influenza viruses 
based on the A) hemagglutinin (HA) and B) neuraminidase (NA) genes, China. Maximum-likelihood trees were constructed by 
using the the general time reversible plus gamma distribution plus invariant sites (GTR+G+I) model in MEGA 6.06 (http://www.
megasoftware.net). Bootstrap values were calculated on 1,000 replicates; only values >60% are shown. A/Guangzhou/39715/2014 
and A/Sichuan/26221/2014 are indicated by a circle and a square, respectively. Brackets denote H5 subtype virus clades. Scale bars 
indicate nucleotide substitutions per site. Full HA and NA trees are provided in online Technical Appendix 1 (http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/21/12/15-0809-Techapp1.pdf).
HA gene phylogeny confirmed that this virus belonged 
to clade 2.3.4.4 (online Technical Appendix 1). Notably, the 
HA genes of the H5N1, H5N2, and H5N8 viruses that were 
recently detected in wild birds in North America also belong 
to this clade, indicating that viruses from this clade are be-
coming globally widespread. More specifically, this isolate 
clustered within a sublineage that includes H5N6 isolates 
from poultry from Guangdong and Jiangxi provinces, China, 
and from Laos (5,7). The A/Sichuan/26221/2014 (H5N6) vi-
rus that recently caused a fatal human infection in Sichuan 
Province, China is also within clade 2.3.4.4, but clusters in a 
distinct sub-lineage (Figure, panel A).
The HA cleavage site of both human isolates contained 
multiple basic amino acids, suggesting that that they are 
highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Amino acid sub-
stitutions E190D, Q226L, or G228S (H3 numbering) in 
the HA gene that are known to enhance binding to mam-
malian receptors were not found. The NA gene phylogeny 
showed that A/Guangzhou/39715/2014 is likely originated 
from group II lineage influenza A(H6N6) viruses that cir-
culate among domestic ducks in China (8) (Figure, panel 
B). An 11-aa deletion at the residue 59–69 position of the 
NA protein was identified in the isolate of this study, in the 
other H5N6 viruses of the same cluster, and in an H4N6 
virus isolate from a duck in Shanghai, China. This dele-
tion was monophyletic and likely originated from A/swine/
Guangdong/K6/2010 (H6N6)–like viruses (Figure, panel 
B). However, it was not observed in other 2.3.4.4 viruses, 
such as A/Sichuan/26221/2014.
No mutations associated with oseltamivir or aman-
tadine resistance was found in NA or M2 genes. The in-
ternal genes of the current H5N6 isolate were similar to 
2.3.2.1b H5N1 subtype viruses found in domestic ducks 
from south-central and eastern China (5,7–10; online Tech-
nical Appendix 1). The 6 internal genes are 97%–99% 
homologous to another isolate from a human, A/Sichuan/ 
26221/2014, suggesting that the internal genes of the 
viruses may reassort from a common origin.
The phylogenetic clustering observed for the HA gene 
was also conserved for the internal genes. In contrast with 
all avian viruses within this clade, the current human isolate 
contains the mammalian adaptation mutation PB2-E627K, 
and A/Sichuan/26221/2014 has acquired PB2-D701N, 
suggesting a rapid acquisition of mammalian adaptation 
changes that likely arose after human infection.
There is still limited information on human disease 
caused by the emerging H5 lineage. Our genetic analysis 
suggests that the H5N6 virus isolated from the patient is 
originated from the avian host. Although the genetic back-
ground of H5N6 virus isolated from the third case in Yun-
nan Province, China, on January 2015 is still not known, 
the isolates from the human cases of H5N6 infection 
reported to date show distant genetic diversity, indicating 
that viruses from both clusters may pose a threat to hu-
mans. This rapidly evolving and globally spreading virus 
lineage thus provides a threat to global public health.
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To the Editor: Active surveillance for zoonotic patho-
gens in wildlife is particularly critical when the pathogen 
has the potential to cause a large-scale outbreak. The recent 
outbreak of Ebola virus (EBOV) disease in West Africa in 
2014 was initiated by a single spillover event, followed by 
human-to-human transmission (1). Projection of filovirus 
ecologic niches suggests possible areas of distribution in 
Southeast Asia (2). Reston virus was discovered in ma-
caques exported from the Philippines to the United States 
in 1989 and in sick domestic pigs in the Philippines in 2008 
(with asymptomatic infection in humans) (3). Dead insec-
tivorous bats in Europe were found to be infected by a filo-
virus, similar to other members of the genus Ebolavirus (4).
Although EBOV has historically been viewed as a vi-
rus from Africa, recent studies found that bat populations 
in Bangladesh and China contain antibodies against EBOV 
and Reston virus recombinant proteins, which suggests that 
EBOVs are widely distributed throughout Asia (5,6). Thus, 
an outbreak in Asian countries free of EBOV diseases may 
not only be caused by importation of infected humans 
and/or wildlife from Africa but may arise from in-country 
filovirus–infected wildlife. Serologic and molecular evi-
dence for filoviruses suggests that members of the order 
Chiroptera (bats) may be their natural reservoir (7).
As part of a proactive biosurveillance program, we 
conducted a cross-sectional study for EBOV infection in 
bats and macaques in Thailand. We screened 500 Pteropus 
lylei bats collected from 10 roosting sites during March–
June 2014 (online Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.
gov/EID/article/20/12/15-0860-Techapp1.pdf) for antibod-
ies against EBOV antigen by using an ELISA validated by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, 
GA, USA) (8).
Bats and macaques were captured with permission from 
the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Con-
servation. The Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
at the University of California, Davis (protocol #16048) ap-
proved the capture and sample collection protocols.
To further screen a wide range of wildlife species in 
Thailand for active EBOV infection, we sampled and tested 
699 healthy bats, representing 26 species, and 50 long-tailed 
macaques (Macaca fascicularis). Additional bat species were 
randomly captured (≥50/site) in 6 provinces in Thailand dur-
ing 2011–2013 and identified by morphologic traits. Ma-
caques were captured and sampled in March 2013 from 1 site 
at Khao Chakan, Sa Kaeo Province, and released at the same 
site. Blood, saliva, urine, and feces were collected from anes-
thetized macaques or nonanesthetized bats. All animals were 
released after sample collection. Details on species screened, 
sample sizes, and trapping localities are provided in the Table. 
All nonblood specimens were collected in nucleic 
acid extraction buffer (lysis buffer) and transported on ice 
to the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre 
for Research and Training on Viral Zoonoses laboratory 
(Bangkok, Thailand) for storage and testing. Three types 
of specimen (saliva, urine, and serum) were collected from 
individual animals and pooled.
Nucleic acid was then extracted with NucliSENS easy-
MAG (bioMérieux, Boxtel, the Netherlands) and analyzed 
by reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR). A consensus RT-
PCR was used to screen for all known species of Ebola vi-
rus and Marburg virus, including EBOV (9). In total, 5 RT-
PCRs were performed on each specimen, a regimen that 
included 4 sets of primers specific to known filoviruses and 
1 degenerate primer set to detect novel viruses in this fam-
ily. The sensitivity of RT-PCR on synthetic standard was 
50–500 copies/reaction (9). We ran 3,745 PCRs, covering a 
range of assays, to increase detection sensitivity. All speci-
mens examined were negative for filoviruses by EBOV 
ELISA and PCR (Table). For P. lylei ELISA screening, op-
tical density values for all 500 bats ranged from 0.000 to 
0.095, well below the potential positive cutoff value of 0.2. 
Assuming a population size of ≈5,000 bats/roost and 
a sample size of 50 bats/site, we have 95% confidence that 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 21, No. 12, December 2015 2271
LETTERS
